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Abstract 
We use new panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and the balance sheets of 45 of the 
largest multinational bank holdings to analyze what determines the credit growth of their subsidiaries. 
We find evidence for the existence of internal capital markets through which multinational banks 
manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. Multinational bank subsidiaries with financially strong 
parent banks are able to expand their lending faster. As a result of parental support, foreign bank 
subsidiaries also do not need to rein in their credit supply during a financial crisis, while domestic 
banks need to do so. 
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 1. Introduction 
In this paper, we analyze two interrelated questions. First, we ask whether multinational banks operate 
an internal capital market across national boundaries. By an internal capital market we mean that 
parent banks allocate scarce capital to their subsidiaries. A multinational bank would not operate such 
a market in the absence of capital market frictions (Stein, 1997). Rather, subsidiaries would attract 
sufficient liabilities to finance profitable investment projects themselves. However, if capital markets 
are not functioning perfectly, it can be advantageous for parent banks with better access to external 
funding, to internally allocate capital to subsidiaries in order to manage their lending growth. Whether 
a bank operates an internal capital market or not is important because such a market creates financial 
linkages between subsidiaries. 
 The second and related issue we analyze concerns the consequences that the operation of an 
internal capital market by multinational banks may have for the countries involved. We ask whether 
the presence of multinational bank subsidiaries means that economic shocks are more easily 
transmitted across borders. In addition we want to know whether multinational bank subsidiaries ‘cut 
and run’ during a financial crisis or whether they, on the contrary, provide a stable source of credit (in 
particular when compared to domestic banks). 
 We contribute to the research on the existence and the ramifications of internal capital markets in 
several ways. As regards the existence of internal capital markets, we make two contributions. First, 
we examine whether banks operate internal capital markets across national boundaries. Empirical 
evidence on internal capital markets within banks only exists for the United States. Houston et al. 
(1997) show that the credit growth of a subsidiary is negatively correlated with the loan growth in 
other US subsidiaries of the bank holding. Dahl et al. (2002) show that such correlated credit growth 
patterns are due to equity flows between the parent bank and its subsidiaries. Ashcraft (2004) 
demonstrates that banks that are affiliated with a multi-bank holding company are less likely to 
experience financial distress and recover more quickly in case of such distress because of capital 
injections by the parent company. We extend this line of research to multinational banks.1
 
1 National regulatory constraints may also influence multinational bank lending. However, we expect that such 
constraints are more important for the initial entry decision of a multinational bank than for the credit expansion 
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 Second, our detailed information on intra-bank ownership allows us to analyze whether particular 
types of multinational bank subsidiaries are more closely integrated into internal capital markets than 
others. We distinguish between greenfield subsidiaries and takeover subsidiaries as well as between 
subsidiaries that are geographically close to their parent bank and those that are further away. Earlier 
empirical research treated bank subsidiaries as a homogenous group and ignored the potential 
differences between subsidiary types. 
 We also contribute to the research on the effects of multinational banking. Earlier research shows 
that lending by multinational banks tends to transmit home country financial shocks (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1997, 2000a; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000, 2001) but dampen host country financial 
shocks (Peek and Rosengren, 2000b; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). Multinational bank lending 
also tends to be influenced by the home country business cycle (Martinez Peria et al., 2002; Morgan 
and Strahan, 2004). We improve on this work in two ways. First, most studies limit themselves to 
multinational bank linkages between one specific home region (United States, Japan or Western 
Europe) and one specific host region (Latin America or central and eastern Europe). Our approach 
differs in that we do not make an ex ante distinction between home and host regions but acknowledge 
that countries can be home and host country at the same time. We also use a more comprehensive 
country sample that better reflects the current state of bank globalization: 
• Our dataset includes 45 multinational banks from 18 home countries with 194 subsidiaries 
across 46 countries. Most parent banks (83 per cent) and subsidiaries (73 per cent) are based 
in Europe, partly reflecting the eastward expansion of many European banks after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. Only about 14 per cent of all parent banks and subsidiaries are based in 
North America. North American banks are relatively domestically oriented, whereas 
European banks are on average more internationalized (IMF, 2007). 
• The number of multinational bank subsidiaries in Africa and Asia is limited as many countries 
in these regions still have limitations on majority foreign bank ownership. Latin America is 
host to some 5 per cent of all subsidiaries in our dataset, mainly of Spanish origin.  
 
once the bank has entered a country. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) analyze the determinants of banks’ foreign 
expansion while we analyze what determines their lending once they have established subsidiaries. 
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 • The time dimension (1991-2004) of our dataset reveals that banking systems have become 
increasingly globalised over time. Not only did the number of multinational banks increase, 
individual banks also became more globalised as measured by the number of foreign 
subsidiaries, especially through foreign takeovers. 
A second improvement of our empirical approach compared to existing studies is that we use bank-
level information on intra-bank linkages rather than aggregate bank lending data. Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2000, 2001) find that multinational banks adjust credit lines to third countries in reaction 
to losses in a crisis country. However, the authors use aggregate Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) data and therefore cannot measure intra-bank linkages at the bank level. Peek and Rosengren 
(2000a), in their study of multinational bank lending in Latin America, rely on aggregated BIS data as 
well. Our bank-level data allow us to more precisely attribute empirical findings to banks’ internal 
capital markets rather than to more general cross-country correlations. 
 We find that subsidiaries of stronger parent banks grow faster and that parent banks trade off 
lending across countries. As a result of parental support, foreign bank subsidiaries do not typically 
rein in their lending during a financial crisis, while domestic banks are forced to do so. These findings 
are in line with earlier empirical results for specific regions, but are based on a much broader sample 
of home and host countries and on bank-level rather than aggregated data. Our findings are also the 
first to show that banks not only operate internal capital markets at the national but also at the 
international level. Greenfield subsidiaries and remote subsidiaries are most closely integrated into 
such internal capital markets. 
 A limitation of our empirical approach is that we cannot track the actual transactions within 
internal capital markets and therefore cannot fully ascertain that the bank lending patterns we find are 
caused by equity flows between parent banks and their subsidiaries (as Dahl et al. (2002) showed for 
bank holdings in the USA). However, on the basis of a number of innovative robustness tests we are 
able to rule out the most likely alternative explanations for the lending patterns we observe. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop our theoretical 
predictions. Section 3 discusses the data we use, after which Section 4 explains our estimation 
methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results and Section 7 concludes. 
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 2. Some theoretical predictions on multinational bank lending 
We use the model by Morgan et al. (2004) to develop three priors with regard to lending by 
multinational bank subsidiaries that are part of an internal capital market. In this incentive model, 
which is a two-country version of the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997), multinational banks are 
capital constrained and risk neutral. They rebalance their international credit portfolio in reaction to 
financial or real-economic country-specific shocks. A financial shock originates in the multinational 
bank itself and wipes out part of its capital or reduces its funding base. In the case of a Spanish bank 
with a Brazilian subsidiary, a costly fraud case in the Spanish head office that wipes out part of its 
capital would constitute a home country financial shock. Similar losses in the Brazilian subsidiary 
would be a host country financial shock. Real-economic shocks are changes in the investment 
opportunities in a country that originate outside of the banking system. For instance, in the above 
example, a sharp contraction in economic growth in Brazil would be a host country real economic 
shock, whereas a cyclical downturn in Spain would be a home country real shock.  
 In the Morgan et al. (2004) model, multinational banks reallocate capital between countries in 
reaction to shocks to ensure that the return on capital remains equal in both countries. The internal 
capital market is the mechanism to do so, and the operation of this market has two main implications. 
First, the parent bank helps ailing subsidiaries that are hit by a financial shock by allocating additional 
capital. This is the support effect. Parental support implies that the presence of multinational banks 
can dampen financial shocks in the host country. A Brazilian subsidiary that is hit by a large fraud 
case will be able to replenish its capital base with the help of its Spanish parent. The parent bank may 
also provide intra-bank loans to its subsidiary in case the funding base of the latter is squeezed during 
a systemic banking crisis in Brazil. 
 Second, the multinational bank reallocates capital among its subsidiaries in reaction to real-
economic shocks that change the profitability of lending in a country. We call this the substitution 
effect. The substitution effect implies that multinational banks sharpen business cycles as they use 
their internal capital market to shift capital from low-return countries to high-return countries. In 
reaction to an economic downturn in Brazil, a Spanish parent bank may decide to re-allocate capital 
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 from its Brazilian subsidiary to the Spanish headquarters, where it can be used more profitably. Based 
on this theoretical framework we derive the following three predictions: 
1. Lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is negatively (positively) related to the business cycle 
in the home country and in countries where other subsidiaries operate (host country); 
2. Lending by multinational bank subsidiaries does not decrease during systemic banking crises in 
the host country, whereas the opposite is true for domestic banks; 
3. Multinational bank subsidiaries that belong to a financially strong banking group expand their 
lending faster than subsidiaries that belong to a financially weaker banking group. 
The first prior reflects the substitution effect: parent banks use their internal capital market to let 
subsidiaries in fast-growing economies expand lending faster compared with subsidiaries in more 
slowly developing economies. Note that also lending by domestic banks may be positively related to 
the local business cycle. We nevertheless expect this positive relationship to be less strong than for 
multinational bank subsidiaries, as most domestic banks only operate in the host country and therefore 
cannot switch easily to foreign lending alternatives. 
 The second and third priors reflect the support effect: subsidiaries can count on capital and 
liquidity support from their parent bank in times of need, whereas domestic banks cannot. The third 
prior reflects that subsidiaries of financially strong parent banks are expected to grow faster (all else 
equal) because they can rely on more capital support than subsidiaries of weak parents. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our sample of multinational banks is based on the Top 1000 of the world’s largest banks (asset rank) 
as published by The Banker. From the 150 largest banks on this list we identified banks with more 
than one significant foreign bank subsidiary. This resulted in a sample of 45 bank holdings, for which 
we then identified – on the basis of BankScope, banks’ websites, and correspondence with banks – all 
subsidiaries of which the assets account for 0.5 per cent or more of the parent bank’s assets in 2004 
and that are at least 50 per cent owned by the parent bank. We therefore limit ourselves to relatively 
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 large subsidiaries in which the parent has a controlling stake.2 For each significant subsidiary (level 1) 
we also check whether it owns sub-subsidiaries (level 2) that are larger than 0.5 per cent of the 
ultimate bank holding (level 0). If this is not the case, we include consolidated data for the level 1 
subsidiaries. If it is, we include unconsolidated data for the level 1 subsidiary and separately include 
consolidated data for the sub-subsidiary. Multinational banks not only operate foreign subsidiaries but 
also foreign branches. Since we focus on internal capital markets, we are mainly interested in foreign 
subsidiaries as these are legally independent affiliates that require a separate capitalization. 
 If parent banks are the result of a merger or acquisition in year t we include them from year t+1 
onwards. We disregard banks for which we have less than three consecutive years of data (all Chinese 
and most Japanese banks). For each subsidiary we trace back in which year t it became part of the 
holding. For the greenfield subsidiaries we use data from year t onwards, whereas we include 
subsidiaries that result from a takeover from t+1.3 Annex 1 provides a list of all banks. As a double 
check on database quality, we contacted each parent bank asking for confirmation that the subsidiaries 
we identified were indeed those considered as material by the bank itself. We also asked for the dates 
when non-greenfield subsidiaries were acquired. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of our 
sample. In a typical year, a parent bank in our sample owns on average 4.3 subsidiaries. The 
proportion of the assets owned by takeover subsidiaries, greenfields, and parents remains stable over 
time with on average shares of 4 per cent, 20 per cent and 76 per cent in our sample, respectively. 
 We obtain financial data on all parent banks and subsidiaries from Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope 
database. Our sample period is 1991-2004, but the panel is unbalanced as we do not have data for all 
years for each bank. Because not all banks report in the same currency we convert all financial 
variables into US dollars. 
 
2 We include commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, mortgage banks, and long-term credit banks 
and exclude investment banks, securities houses, state banks, and non-bank credit institutions. 
3 We exclude multinational bank subsidiaries in Luxembourg and Switzerland as the activities of subsidiaries in 
these countries are mainly driven by the deposit supply of (foreign) residents rather than by local 
macroeconomic developments or parent banks’ influence. 
 6
 Figure 1 Location of parent banks (black) and subsidiaries (white) (2004)
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 Our dependent variable is the percentage growth of gross loans. Alternatively, one could choose the 
percentage growth of (book) capital as a dependent variable that captures parent bank influence. We 
choose to focus on lending growth rather than capital growth because many multinational banks 
operate internal capital markets for (unobservable) risk capital in addition to book capital. De Haas 
and Naaborg (2006) use structured interviews with bank managers of multinational banks to analyze 
how banks manage the lending of foreign subsidiaries. They find that typically banks set credit 
growth targets for their subsidiaries and then support these – to the extent necessary – through 
liquidity assistance and book capital support. In addition, however, banks use economic capital 
models and minimum rate of return requirements to influence subsidiaries’ ability to reach their credit 
growth targets. The results indicate that parent banks do not always need to move book capital in 
order to steer subsidiaries’ lending. They can also manage lending more directly by setting credit 
growth targets and allocating risk capital. To capture the joint effect of these mechanisms, we use 
subsidiaries’ credit growth as our outcome variable. To construct our gross credit growth variable, we 
add loan loss reserves to net loans. This corrects for changes in (net) loans that are not due to changes 
in banks’ output of new loans, but are caused by changes in loan loss provisioning. 
 We check for outliers and remove observations with implausible values for one or more 
variables. To control for mergers and acquisitions we also remove observations where absolute loan 
growth exceeds 75 per cent. This data cleansing reduces the number of observations by 13 per cent.4 
Annex 2 summarizes the statistical characteristics of our data. Subsidiaries have on average a higher 
solvency, expressed as total equity to total assets, than parent banks. Subsidiaries also experience 
somewhat faster credit growth than parent banks, which may contribute to their lower profitability. 
 
4. Estimation approach and methodology 
We estimate three types of regressions to test the predictions of Section 2. In all cases the dependent 
variable is the credit growth of subsidiary i and the independent variables comprise host country 
variables and financial characteristics of subsidiary i itself. The first regression – (1) – is the basic 
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 model where we treat the subsidiary as if it operates on a stand-alone basis. Credit growth is solely 
determined by subsidiary specific variables and host country macroeconomic variables, including a 
crisis dummy (predictions 1 and 2). 
 In the second regression – (2) – we add financial characteristics of the parent bank to test for 
support effects (prediction 3), while in the third regression – (3) – we test whether lending growth of a 
subsidiary is affected by variables related to other subsidiaries in the banking group. These variables 
include (weighted) macroeconomic variables related to the countries where the other subsidiaries are 
based (prediction 1) and variables measuring the (weighted) financial situation of these subsidiaries. 
We remain agnostic about the sign of the coefficients for the variables related to other subsidiaries. In 
case of strong substitution effects, we would expect negative signs as parent banks reallocate capital 
from weak to more profitable subsidiaries. In case support effects dominate, we would expect a 
positive relationship as financially strong subsidiaries improve the condition of the whole group, thus 
benefiting other subsidiaries. The three regression types can be summarized as follows: 
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where 
• ΔLit (ΔLit-1) is the percentage credit growth of subsidiary i in year t (t-1 if lagged) 
 
4 We also ran estimations in which we only excluded observations where loan growth exceeded 100 per cent. 
This reduced our dataset by only six per cent. Our results stayed the same in terms of both the signs of the 
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 • α1, α2 and α3 are intercept terms; γ1, γ2 and γ3 are coefficients and βk are coefficient vectors 
• HOSTit is a matrix of host country macroeconomic variables 
• SUBit is a matrix of characteristics related to bank subsidiary i 
• PARENTit is a matrix of characteristics related to the parent bank holding of subsidiary i  
• HOMEit is a matrix of home country macroeconomic variables 
• OTHCOit is a matrix of (weighted) macroeconomic variables related to the other countries where 
the bank holding operates (excluding the home country) 
• OTHSUit is a matrix of (weighted) characteristics related to other subsidiaries of the parent bank 
• itε  is the idiosyncratic error, ( )2it 0, IID~ εσε  
• i=1,..., N where N is the number of bank subsidiaries in the sample 
• t=1,..., Ti where Ti is the number of years in the sample for bank subsidiary i. 
 
HOST (HOME) are host country (home country) macroeconomic variables that reflect the attractiveness 
of expanding credit in a host country (home country): GDP growth (+), the unemployment rate (-), the 
nominal exchange rate against the US dollar (+), and inflation (-) (expected sign for the host country 
variables in parentheses). Banks will expand lending if GDP growth is high and unemployment and 
inflation are low.  We also include a crisis dummy, HOSTCRIS (HOMECRIS), which takes on the value 
of ‘1’ for years in which the host (home) country experienced a banking crisis. The dummy is based 
on Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Carstens et al. (2004). For 2004, we constructed it on the basis 
of publications in print and on the internet. We expect that multinational bank lending will not slow 
during a systemic banking crisis, because subsidiaries are supported by their parents (prediction 2). 
5
host country. For each year, we weigh the values for each country where a significant subsidiary is 
 Similarly, OTHCO includes variables measuring the (weighted) macroeconomic development in 
the other countries of operation of the parent bank. These variables reflect the (relative) attractiveness 
of lending in other countries and proxy for the opportunity costs of expanding credit in a particular 
 
estimated coefficients and their statistical significance. 
5 To the extent that host country inflation increases the nominal value of loan portfolios there would be a 
positive effect of inflation on credit growth. However, as we convert our data to US dollars inflationary effects 
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 present with the size of the particular subsidiary relative to the sum of all subsidiaries of the same 
parent in our sample. For instance, for HSBC Brazil we construct an OTHCO GDP growth variable that 
measures the weighted average growth rate of all countries where HSBC operates except Brazil and 
the United Kingdom. If the HSBC subsidiary in Canada would be twice as large as the one in Ireland, 
Canadian GDP growth would count twice as much as Irish GDP growth.6 Finally, the OTHCRIS 
dummy is ‘0’ in all years except for those years in which there was a banking crisis in one or more 
other countries of the banking group.7
 SUB consists of subsidiary-specific variables (expected signs in parentheses). We include 
 
should disappear to the extent that PPP holds. We also include the nominal exchange rate to ensure that our 
arity between this variable and 
solvency (equity to assets (±)) and liquidity (liquid assets to total assets (±)) to measure risk aversion 
and capital/liquidity constraints. On the one hand, high capital and liquidity ratios may reflect that a 
bank is risk-averse and expands credit only slowly. Undercapitalized bank subsidiaries may also be 
prone to moral hazard and rapidly expand (risky) lending (Black and Strahan, 2002). Both effects 
imply a negative relationship between bank capital and loan growth. On the other hand, high capital 
and liquidity ratios may be a sign of non-binding liability constraints that enable banks to expand 
lending. The sign of the coefficients for these variables is therefore indeterminate. Second, we include 
loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (-) as a proxy for the general financial condition of the 
bank as well as its willingness to take on risk. Peek and Rosengren (2000b) find that parent banks’ 
non-performing loans have an even more significant impact on host country lending than parent 
banks’ capitalisation. An increase reflects that higher interest margins only partially compensate for 
higher credit risk. We therefore expect a negative effect on loan growth. Third, we include the return 
on equity (+) and the net interest margin (-) as bank performance indicators. Finally, PARENT includes 
the same bank-specific variables for the parent bank of each subsidiary, whereas OTHSUB consists of 
(weighted) variables for the other subsidiaries of the bank holding (including those in the home 
results for the other macroeconomic variables are not driven by residual exchange rate fluctuations. 
6 If there were several subsidiaries in a host country, we would calculate the OTHCO macroeconomic variables on 
the basis of the other host countries only. For instance, when constructing the OTHCO GDP growth variable for 
one of several Mexican subsidiaries of the same parent bank, we do not include Mexican GDP growth in the 
weighted OTHCO GDP variable. This would, by construction, lead to multicolline
the Mexican GDP growth variable (which is included as a separate determinant). 
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 country).8 Throughout the paper, we report Wald F-statistics. These consistently confirm that the 
explanatory variables related to the parent bank or to the other subsidiaries are jointly significant.  
 To take into account that different types of subsidiaries may be integrated into the parent bank’s 
odologies: fixed effects and two dynamic GMM panel data 
tim
’s J test for overidentifying 
 This dummy is constructed by averaging for each year the ‘0’ and ‘1’ scores for the other countries where the 
parent bank has subsidiaries (weighted with the size of the respective subsidiaries). The OTHCRIS dummy is then 
internal capital market to a varying extents, we create an ownership dummy that is ‘1’ for greenfields 
and ‘0’ for takeovers. We expect that greenfields are more strongly integrated in the multinational 
bank holding than acquired banks. In a separate set of estimations we use this dummy to construct 
interaction terms with the variables that measure the characteristics of the parent bank and of other 
subsidiaries. In doing so, we test whether substitution and support effects are indeed stronger for 
greenfields than for acquired banks. 
 We use three estimation meth
es ators. The choice for fixed effects estimations is based on Hausman tests, which consistently 
show that fixed effects are preferred over random effects because the determinants of credit growth 
are correlated with the bank-specific effects. However, in a dynamic context the lagged dependent 
variable may depend on the panel-level effects and lead to an inconsistent estimator when the time 
dimension is limited (Nickell, 1981). To get around this potential inconsistency problem we also 
report two GMM estimators which have as additional advantages that they require no distributional 
assumptions and allow for heteroscedasticity of unknown form. We first report the results of the 
GMM difference estimator, where the instruments consist of lags of the levels of the explanatory and 
dependent variables (Hansen, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991). In addition we report the GMM 
system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
 To test whether the instruments are valid, we perform the Hansen
restrictions. If we cannot reject the null, the model is supported. This is the case throughout the paper 
(see p-values in the tables). We also report the outcomes of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for 
autocorrelation of order 1 and 2. These consistently show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no second-order autocorrelation (since the estimator is in first differences, first-order autocorrelation 
 
7
assigned the value ‘1’ if the weighted value equals or exceeds 0.25 and the value ‘0’ otherwise. 
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 does not imply inconsistent estimates). We use robust estimators to correct for heteroscedasticity. An 
assumption underlying our panel analysis is that the series are stationary. We test the validity of this 
assumption in a number of ways, but as our time dimension is limited so is the discriminating power 
of the tests (Table A2.2 in Annex 2). Some of the tests also require the panel to be balanced and 
enforcing this requirement means dropping many subsidiaries. We conclude that the variables are 
neither all stationary (Hadri, 2000 test) nor non-stationary (Pesaran, 2003 test). The Taylor and Sarno 
(1998) test indicates that the series are I(0). 
 A final caveat is that a number of regressors may to some extent be endogenous. GMM, which is 
an instrumental variables technique with lagged values of the variables as instruments, partially 
mitigates concerns about reverse causality. In addition, subsidiaries are typically relatively small 
when compared to the multinational bank holding as a whole. The average subsidiary accounts for 
about 10 per cent of its parent bank’s assets, as our sample contains the world’s largest banks which in 
many cases also have significant non-financial operations and equity participations. Reverse causality 
is therefore less likely to be an issue for the regressors that measure the impact of characteristics of 
the parent bank or of other subsidiaries. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Basic empirical results 
We first estimate the basic model in which multinational bank subsidiaries’ credit growth depends on 
lagged credit growth, subsidiary characteristics, and host country characteristics (Table 1, columns 1-
3). Experimenting with various macroeconomic variables leads us to include GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate, as these turn out to be robust determinants of credit growth. Contrary to what one 
might expect, economic growth and the unemployment rate are not strongly correlated over time and 
across countries in our sample. We also include crisis dummies and the nominal exchange rate.9
 
8 In this case, contrary to the macroeconomic OTHCO variables, we also include information on other subsidiaries 
in the same host country and on any separate subsidiaries in the home country (see Footnote 6). 
9 See Footnote 5. Excluding the nominal exchange rate does not significantly change the economic or statistical 
significance of any of the results. 
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 Table 1 Does lending by multinational bank subsidiaries depend on conditions of the parent 
bank and of other subsidiaries within the same banking group? 
 
Dependent variable: Credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
Subsidiary characteristics 
Credit growth 
(lagged) 
0.07 
[0.05]** 
0.11 
[0.03]** 
0.31 
[0.00]*** 
0.04 
[0.27] 
0.08 
[0.19] 
0.25 
[0.00]*** 
0.07 
[0.08]* 
0.09 
[0.16] 
0.19 
[0.03]** 
Weakness -0.00 
[0.96] 
0.00 
[0.86] 
0.00 
[0.91] 
0.00 
[0.86] 
0.00 
[0.62] 
0.00 
[0.73] 
-0.03 
[0.55] 
-0.04 
[0.51] 
-0.03 
[0.64] 
Profitability 0.25 
[0.00]*** 
0.15 
[0.10]* 
0.27 
[0.01]*** 
0.25 
[0.00]*** 
0.17 
[0.05]** 
0.27 
[0.00]*** 
0.12 
[0.38] 
0.00 
[0.98] 
0.02 
[0.87] 
Liquidity -0.52 
[0.00]*** 
-0.51 
[0.00]*** 
-0.20 
[0.05]** 
-0.46 
[0.00]*** 
-0.49 
[0.01]*** 
-0.37 
[0.00]*** 
-0.39 
[0.01]*** 
-0.40 
[0.03]** 
-0.41 
[0.00]*** 
Solvency -1.08 
[0.00]*** 
-0.92 
[0.02]** 
-1.06 
[0.00]*** 
-1.06 
[0.00]*** 
-0.79 
[0.04]** 
-1.03 
[0.00]*** 
-1.05 
[0.01]*** 
-0.62 
[0.09]* 
-1.31 
[0.00]*** 
Host country characteristics 
GDP growth 1.49 
[0.00]*** 
1.43 
[0.00]*** 
1.40 
[0.00]*** 
1.70 
[0.00]*** 
1.60 
[0.00]*** 
1.46 
[0.01]*** 
1.82 
[0.00]*** 
2.02 
[0.00]*** 
2.16 
[0.00]*** 
Unemployment -1.00 
[0.02]** 
-0.84 
[0.08]* 
0.21 
[0.50] 
-1.48 
[0.01]*** 
-1.24 
[0.07]* 
-0.24 
[0.60] 
-1.93 
[0.00]*** 
-1.62 
[0.00]*** 
-0.82 
[0.02]** 
Exchange rate 
[US$] 
0.03 
[0.08]* 
0.04 
[0.12] 
0.01 
[0.46] 
0.03 
[0.06]* 
0.04 
[0.08]* 
0.02 
[0.15] 
0.03 
[0.11] 
0.03 
[0.17] 
0.02 
[0.08]* 
Crisis dummy -1.49 
[0.71] 
-1.96 
[0.71] 
1.78 
[0.71] 
0.74 
[0.88] 
-0.79 
[0.88] 
-2.07 
[0.69] 
-0.05 
[0.99] 
3.50 
[0.60] 
1.71 
[0.85] 
  Parent bank characteristics 
Weakness    -0.07 
[0.35] 
-0.13 
[0.09]* 
-0.26 
[0.09]* 
   
Profitability    -0.20 
[0.20] 
-0.22 
[0.30] 
-0.76 
[0.04]** 
   
Liquidity    -0.50 
[0.00]*** 
-0.56 
[0.01]*** 
-0.38 
[0.05]** 
   
Interest margin    6.27 
[0.00]*** 
7.94 
[0.00]*** 
2.08 
[0.08]* 
   
Characteristics home country and other subsidiaries 
GDP growth       -2.13 
[0.00]*** 
-2.62 
[0.00]*** 
-3.16 
[0.01]*** 
Weakness (other subs.)      -0.06 
[0.45] 
-0.14 
[0.11] 
-0.06 
[0.77] 
Profitability       0.19 
[0.07]* 
0.21 
[0.01]*** 
0.11 
[0.66] 
Liquidity       -0.15 
[0.30] 
-0.28 
[0.05]** 
-0.22 
[0.32] 
Solvency      -0.08 
[0.88] 
-0.60 
[0.16] 
0.82 
[0.16] 
Crisis other countries      -13.17 
[0.23] 
-16.62 
[0.21] 
-24.15 
[0.42] 
Constant 28.01 
[0.00]*** 
25.97 
[0.00]*** 
10.44 
[0.01]*** 
26.81 
[0.00]*** 
22.00 
[0.01]*** 
33.15 
[0.00]*** 
41.48 
[0.00]*** 
45.32 
[0.00]*** 
32.67 
[0.00]*** 
Observations 967 763 967 905 703 905 677 524 677 
No. banks 
No. instruments 
194 183 194 
177 
194 182 194 
177 
147 139 147 
177 
R2within 0.12   0.15   0.15   
Hausman 0.00   0.00   0.00   
AB test AR1 
AB test AR2 
 0.00 
0.66 
0.00 
0.27 
 0.00 
0.48 
0.00 
0.19 
 0.00 
0.85 
0.00 
0.59 
Wald    0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.02 
Hansen J  0.81 0.80  0.95 0.96  0.98 0.79 
Notes: p-values in brackets. ‘GMM diff.’ and ‘GMM system’ refer to estimations using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) difference panel-data estimator (robust) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) system panel-data estimator 
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 (robust), respectively. ‘Hausman’: p-value of the Hausman specification test. ‘AB test AR1(2)’: p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. ‘Wald’: p-value of the 
Wald F-test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are jointly 0. ‘Hansen J’: p-
value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the 
null of instrument validity. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 1 shows that profitable subsidiaries expand credit faster and relatively solvent and liquid 
subsidiaries more slowly. Our conjecture is that relatively solvent and liquid banks are more risk 
averse and grow lending more slowly because they invest more in liquid assets. In contrast, 
undercapitalized subsidiaries with insured liabilities (or the expectation of a parental bail-out) will 
grow relatively fast (Vihriälä, 1996; Black and Strahan; 2002). Subsidiaries also grow faster when 
economic growth is high and unemployment is low in the host country (confirming prediction 1). 
Next we find that multinational bank subsidiaries do not reduce their lending when the host 
country is hit by a systemic banking crisis. This may be because parent banks give financial support to 
such subsidiaries. Section 6.1 provides estimation results for a benchmark group of domestic banks, 
which show that lending by domestic banks – that lack parent bank support – is affected negatively by 
local banking crises. We therefore find a remarkable difference between multinational bank 
subsidiaries and unaffiliated domestic banks that confirms prediction 2. 
Columns 4-6 show similar estimations, but now including parent bank characteristics. Our earlier 
results do not change: subsidiaries grow faster when they are profitable, when they have low solvency 
and liquidity levels, and when local economic growth is high. This model shows that the balance-
sheet structure of the parent bank matters as well. Subsidiaries of highly liquid parent banks tend to 
grow more slowly. Multinational banks with an active market for intrabank loans will have more 
intragroup debt on their balance sheet and, all else equal, retain a smaller cushion of liquid assets 
(cash, government securities). These findings are in line with support effects (prediction 3). 
Subsidiaries of parent banks that enjoy high net interest margins tend to grow faster, while we also 
find weak evidence (10 per cent level) that subsidiaries of weaker parent banks grow slower. The 
positive effect of net interest margin implies that better performing parent banks support their 
subsidiaries more. In case substitution effects would dominate, we would have found a negative 
coefficient. 
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 We include parent bank interest margin and not parent bank solvency because both variables are 
highly correlated (0.8) and thus cannot be included simultaneously. When we include parent bank 
solvency instead of net interest margin, we also find a positive coefficient while the coefficients for all 
other variables stay the same. However, the positive impact of parent bank solvency is statistically 
less significant (10 per cent level at most). One explanation for this is that parent banks tend to hold 
substantial amounts of capital in excess of minimum regulatory capital requirements (e.g. Gambacorta 
and Mistrulli, 2004). Such capital cushions make parent bank capital a less binding constraint on 
intrabank lending. In addition, as we argued in Section 3, parent banks do not need to move book 
capital to steer subsidiaries’ credit growth. This is a second reason why bank capital, compared to net 
interest margin, may be a less strong indicator of the willingness and ability of parent banks to 
manage the credit growth of their foreign subsidiaries. 
 Thirdly, we estimate regressions which include (weighted) variables related to the other 
subsidiaries of the multinational bank (columns 7-9).10 We again find that subsidiaries’ credit growth 
is positively related to the host country business cycle and negatively to their own liquidity and 
solvency. However, profitability is no longer a significant determinant of credit growth.11 Instead, we 
find that when other subsidiaries in the same group are relatively profitable, this positively influences 
the credit supply of a subsidiary (this result is not significant in the system GMM regression). If 
substitution effects would dominate, one would find a negative relationship between other 
subsidiaries’ profitability and credit growth. Support effects are apparently more important: parent 
banks can shore up a subsidiary more when other subsidiaries are doing well. This support effect also 
dominates the influence of subsidiaries’ own profitability. We also find that GDP growth in the home 
country exerts a negative influence on subsidiaries’ credit growth. This is in line with parent banks 
that trade off lending opportunities in various countries (substitution effect, prediction 1). 
 
10 Because of the high (0.6) correlation between other subsidiaries’ interest margin and other subsidiaries’ 
solvency we only include the latter. We include home country GDP growth but not the weighted GDP growth in 
the other countries of operation because both growth rates are highly correlated. 
11 In these estimations the number of banks is smaller because we remove subsidiaries in the same country as the 
parent bank. For these subsidiaries the home and the host country coincide and we have to exclude them to 
prevent artificial multicollinearity between home country variables and host country variables. 
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 Support effects may depend on the exposure that a parent bank has to a particular host country. Parent 
banks may only support large subsidiaries that could pose a threat to the whole group or lead to 
systemic problems in the host country (and thus result in high reputational costs). To test whether this 
is the case we interact our main regressors with two measures of subsidiary importance: the size of the 
subsidiary as a proportion of the parent bank’s balance sheet and the market share of the subsidiary in 
total host-country lending. We do not find any significant and robust results (results available upon 
request from the authors). Parent support is as important for small subsidiaries as it is for large ones. 
 
5.2 Greenfield versus takeover multinational bank subsidiaries 
We expect that subsidiaries formed as a result of a takeover are relatively independent as they may not 
yet be fully integrated into the bank holding. In contrast, greenfield subsidiaries – which are built up 
from scratch by the parent – may be more closely integrated into the bank holding and its internal 
capital market (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). To test this, we re-estimate the empirical models 
and interact the main determinants with an ownership dummy which is ‘1’ for greenfields and ‘0’ for 
takeovers. We do not include the dummy separately since we are interested in the impact of 
ownership on the strength of substitution and support effects and not in the separate impact of 
ownership type on credit growth. Moreover, bank ownership is a time-invariant, bank-specific 
variable and the fixed effects in our FE estimations already capture its influence. To keep the 
regressions parsimonious (and conserve degrees of freedom in the GMM estimations) we omit 
insignificant interaction terms. Table 2 provides the results. 
 As before, lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is sensitive to profitability (+), liquidity (-) 
and solvency (-), as well as to home country GDP growth (-). Subsidiaries grow faster when other 
subsidiaries in the same group are relatively profitable and this effect dominates the impact of the 
subsidiary’s own profitability. We also confirm that subsidiaries of parent banks with high interest 
margins, low liquidity, and stronger balance sheets (lower loan loss provisions to net interest 
revenues) grow faster. We find weak evidence (10 per cent confidence level) that lending by takeover 
subsidiaries is sensitive to the weakness of their balance sheet but lending by greenfield subsidiaries is 
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 not. This is in line with a stronger role of the parent bank in the case of greenfields compared to 
takeovers. 
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 Table 2 Are greenfield subsidiaries more closely integrated into multinational bank groups 
than subsidiaries that are the result of a take-over? 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE GMM 
Diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
Subsidiary characteristics 
Credit growth 
(lagged) 
0.07 
[0.05]** 
0.11 
[0.03]** 
0.29 
[0.00]*** 
0.04 
[0.26] 
0.08 
[0.10]* 
0.22 
[0.01]*** 
0.07 
[0.08]* 
0.08 
[0.22] 
0.20 
[0.04]** 
Weakness -0.12 
[0.05]** 
-0.12 
[0.08]* 
0.02 
[0.74] 
-0.12 
[0.07]* 
-0.11 
[0.15] 
0.01 
[0.78] 
-0.04 
[0.44] 
-0.05 
[0.44] 
-0.05 
[0.46] 
Weakness/green- 
field interaction 
0.13 
[0.05]** 
0.13 
[0.07]* 
-0.01 
[0.87] 
0.13 
[0.05]** 
0.12 
[0.15] 
-0.00 
[0.95] 
0.14 
[0.12] 
0.12 
[0.19] 
0.00 
[0.78] 
Profitability 0.23 
[0.01]*** 
0.20 
[0.05]** 
0.23 
[0.03]** 
0.24 
[0.01]*** 
0.21 
[0.05]** 
0.21 
[0.04]** 
0.15 
[0.27] 
0.05 
[0.74] 
0.02 
[0.98] 
Liquidity -0.52 
[0.00]*** 
-0.50 
[0.00]*** 
-0.28 
[0.04]** 
-0.46 
[0.00]*** 
-0.40 
[0.02]** 
-0.48 
[0.00]*** 
-0.38 
[0.01]*** 
-0.44 
[0.01]*** 
-0.54 
[0.00]*** 
Solvency -1.07 
[0.00]*** 
-0.92 
[0.01]*** 
-1.29 
[0.00]*** 
-1.03 
[0.00]*** 
-0.91 
[0.01]*** 
-1.04 
[0.00]*** 
-0.99 
[0.01]*** 
-0.72 
[0.05]** 
-1.34 
[0.00]*** 
Host country characteristics 
GDP growth -0.49 
[0.51] 
0.11 
[0.86] 
2.06 
[0.01]*** 
-0.61 
[0.43] 
-0.07 
[0.93] 
1.86 
[0.01]*** 
0.41 
[0.62] 
0.34 
[0.62] 
2.71 
[0.01]*** 
GDP/greenfield 
interaction 
2.38 
[0.00]*** 
1.63 
[0.04]** 
-0.54 
[0.51] 
2.75 
[0.00]*** 
2.02 
[0.03]** 
-0.25 
[0.76] 
1.73 
[0.05]** 
2.20 
[0.00]*** 
-0.67 
[0.53] 
Unemployment -0.98 
[0.02]** 
-0.74 
[0.10]* 
0.13 
[0.68] 
-1.42 
[0.01]*** 
-1.21 
[0.06]* 
-0.68 
[0.07]* 
-1.90 
[0.00]*** 
-1.72 
[0.00]*** 
-0.87 
[0.03]** 
Exchange rate 
[US$] 
0.02 
[0.15] 
0.03 
[0.11] 
0.01 
[0.01]** 
0.02 
[0.14] 
0.03 
[0.11] 
0.02 
[0.00]*** 
0.02 
[0.20] 
0.03 
[0.11] 
0.03 
[0.00]*** 
Crisis dummy -1.73 
[0.66] 
-0.63 
[0.90] 
-3.51 
[0.62] 
0.46 
[0.92] 
1.39 
[0.77] 
-9.77 
[0.20] 
-0.55 
0.93] 
4.51 
[0.50] 
-1.22 
[0.88] 
Parent bank characteristics 
Weakness (other subs.)   -0.06 
[0.42] 
-0.10 
[0.22] 
-0.36 
[0.01]*** 
   
Profitability    -0.14 
[0.36] 
0.19 
[0.34] 
-1.03 
[0.00]*** 
   
Liquidity    -0.53 
[0.00]*** 
-0.50 
[0.01]*** 
-0.26 
[0.26] 
   
Interest margin    6.54 
[0.00]*** 
5.98 
[0.00]*** 
1.97 
[0.17] 
   
Characteristics home country and other subsidiaries 
GDP growth       -2.23 
[0.00]*** 
-2.48 
[0.00]*** 
-2.70 
[0.02]** 
Weakness      -0.06 
[0.41] 
-0.14 
[0.10]* 
0.05 
[0.81] 
Profitability      0.19 
[0.05]** 
0.22 
[0.01]*** 
-0.02 
[0.94] 
Liquidity      -0.14 
[0.33] 
-0.24 
[0.08]* 
-0.31 
[0.11] 
Solvency      -0.07 
[0.89] 
[-0.50] 
[0.25] 
0.67 
[0.25] 
Crisis other countries      -12.45 
[0.26] 
-16.24 
[0.20] 
-17.65 
[0.56] 
Constant 29.69 
[0.00]*** 
25.50 
[0.00]*** 
13.81 
[0.00]*** 
26.98 
[0.00]*** 
25.13 
[0.00]*** 
42.66 
[0.00]*** 
41.22 
[0.00]*** 
45.74 
[0.00]*** 
36.47 
[0.00]*** 
Observations 967 763 967 905 703 905 677 524 677 
No. banks 
No. instruments 
194 183 194 
139 
194 182 194 
139 
147 139 147 
116 
R2within 0.13   0.16   0.16   
Hausman 0.00   0.00   0.00   
AB test AR1 
AB test AR2 
 0.00 
0.66 
0.00 
0.32 
 0.00 
0.45 
0.00 
0.21 
 0.00 
0.82 
0.00 
0.57 
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 Wald    0.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.07 
Hansen J  0.94 0.22  0.88 0.42  0.98 0.67 
Notes: p-values in brackets. ‘GMM diff.’ and ‘GMM system’ refer to estimations using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) difference panel-data estimator (robust) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) system panel-data estimator 
(robust), respectively. ‘Hausman’: p-value of the Hausman specification test. ‘AB test AR1(2)’: p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. ‘Wald’: p-value of the 
Wald F-test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are jointly 0. ‘Hansen J’: p-
value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the 
null of instrument validity. ‘Ownership’ is a dummy variable which takes on the values of 0 (1) for takeovers 
(greenfields). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
We also find that host country GDP growth only matters for greenfield subsidiaries. Lending by 
takeovers is less strongly correlated with the local business cycle, perhaps because these banks have 
not yet been well integrated into the parent bank and substitution effects are less important.12
 
5.3 The influence of geographical distance 
The influence of parent bank characteristics and economic developments in the home country on 
subsidiaries’ credit growth may depend on the distance between the parent bank and a subsidiary. If 
the incentives of subsidiary managers are not aligned with those of the parent bank, internal agency 
costs hamper the operation of an internal capital market. Such costs increase with distance if parent 
bank’s senior management finds it difficult to manage junior management in far-away places (Rajan 
et al, 2000). Greater intrabank distances may also lead to more lost or distorted information within the 
bank. Operating an internal capital market may therefore be more difficult in geographically complex 
banks where there is a large distance between the parent bank and the various subsidiaries.13
 However, contrary to the above, Carlin et al. (2006) point out that a larger distance between 
parent and subsidiary may allow organizations to operate an internal capital market on a more 
objective basis since there is less room for local managers to lobby the headquarters. Banks with 
distant subsidiaries may be less liable to internal agency costs if they use formally structured decision-
making mechanisms that reduce foreign managers’ opportunities to evade the financial discipline of 
the internal capital market. Berger and DeYoung (2001) show that bank holdings which choose to be 
geographically dispersed are banks that are relatively good at controlling distant affiliates. Senior 
 
12 The GMM system estimations fail to detect a significant difference between greenfields and takeovers. 
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 management of expanding banks may also, at least temporarily, focus on recently purchased remote 
subsidiaries while exercising less control over nearby subsidiaries that have been part of the holding 
for longer (Berger and DeYoung, 2001). For these reasons, geographically distant subsidiaries may be 
more strongly integrated into an internal capital market. 
 To empirically analyze the importance of geographical distance, we interact all macroeconomic 
variables and parent bank characteristics with a measure of the geographical distance between the 
parent bank and the subsidiary. As in Table 2 and in line with Carlin et al. (2006) we do not include 
distance as a separate determinant as we are only interested in the effect of distance on the influence 
of the parent bank and not so much in the separate effect distance may have on credit growth. We 
calculate distance on the basis of the latitude and longitude co-ordinates of both banks using the great 
circle distance formula. Regression results showed that especially the interaction term between host 
country GDP growth and geographical distance is significantly positive and robust. The strong 
positive link between subsidiary lending and the host country business cycle (procyclicality) turns out 
to be mainly caused by remote subsidiaries. Table 2 already showed that greenfields drive the 
procyclical lending of multinational bank subsidiaries. This leads to the question whether greenfield 
subsidiaries are on average more distant than subsidiaries that are the result of a takeover. This turns 
out to be the case: foreign greenfields are on average 773 km further away from their parent banks 
than foreign takeovers (although this difference is not statistically significant). 
 We now test whether it is mainly ownership type or distance that determines how strongly a 
subsidiary is integrated into the parent bank’s internal capital market. Table 3 shows regressions 
similar to those in Table 2, but now also including the interaction term between host country GDP 
growth and geographical distance. 
 
13 A related literature finds that there are not only agency costs associated with monitoring geographically 
complex financial institutions, but also with managing financial conglomerates that engage in a diverse set of 
activities (Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
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 Table 3 Does geographical distance determine the level of foreign subsidiaries’ integration 
within multinational bank groups? 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE GMM 
Diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
Subsidiary characteristics 
Credit growth 
(lagged) 
0.07 
[0.03]** 
0.11 
[0.04]** 
0.29 
[0.00]*** 
0.05 
[0.20] 
0.07 
[0.23] 
0.23 
[0.00]*** 
0.08 
[0.06]* 
0.10 
[0.13] 
0.20 
[0.02]** 
Weakness -0.00 
[0.86] 
-0.00 
[0.97] 
-0.00 
[0.89] 
0.00 
[0.97] 
0.00 
[0.83] 
0.00 
[0.92] 
-0.03 
[0.53] 
-0.05 
[0.49] 
-0.01 
[0.83] 
Profitability 0.26
  
[0.00]*** 
0.16 
[0.05]** 
0.22 
[0.02]** 
0.27 
[0.00]*** 
0.19 
[0.02]** 
0.23 
[0.01]*** 
0.15 
[0.28] 
0.05 
[0.75] 
0.09 
[0.52] 
Liquidity -0.52 
[0.00]*** 
-0.51 
[0.00]*** 
-0.21 
[0.05]** 
-0.45 
[0.00]*** 
-0.48 
[0.01]*** 
-0.34 
[0.00]*** 
-0.39 
[0.01]*** 
-0.35 
[0.06]* 
-0.32 
[0.02]** 
Solvency -1.02 
[0.00]*** 
-0.83 
[0.02]** 
-1.13 
[0.00]*** 
-0.96 
[0.01]*** 
-0.60 
[0.10]* 
-1.14 
[0.00]*** 
-0.97 
[0.02]** 
-0.57 
[0.10]* 
-1.30 
[0.00]*** 
Host country characteristics 
GDP growth -0.92 
[0.26] 
-1.25 
[0.18] 
3.75 
[0.00]*** 
-1.22 
[0.17] 
-1.94 
[0.07]* 
3.08 
[0.01]*** 
-0.53 
[0.64] 
0.25 
[0.85] 
3.34 
[0.02]** 
GDP/greenfield 
interaction 
1.77 
[0.02]** 
1.59 
[0.05]** 
-1.81 
[0.13] 
2.12 
[0.01]*** 
2.21 
[0.01]*** 
-0.80 
[0.45] 
1.55 
[0.08]* 
1.55 
[0.04]** 
-0.08 
[0.94] 
GDP/distance 
Interaction 
0.15 
[0.03]** 
0.21 
[0.01]** 
-0.16 
[0.07]* 
0.17 
[0.03]** 
0.23 
[0.01]** 
-0.14 
[0.11] 
0.14 
[0.10]* 
0.06 
[0.66] 
-0.18 
[0.20] 
Unemployment -1.04 
[0.01]*** 
-0.90 
[0.06]* 
0.06 
[0.85] 
-1.41 
[0.01]** 
-1.07 
[0.10]* 
-0.41 
[0.37] 
-2.00 
[0.00]*** 
-1.57 
[0.00]*** 
-1.01 
[0.00]*** 
Exchange rate 
[US$] 
0.02 
[0.19] 
0.03 
[0.16] 
0.01 
[0.37] 
0.02 
[0.17] 
0.03 
[0.14] 
0.02 
[0.17] 
0.03 
[0.14] 
0.02 
[0.21] 
0.02 
[0.06]* 
Crisis dummy -1.46 
[0.71] 
-2.17 
[0.68] 
2.32 
[0.64] 
1.42 
[0.77] 
-0.26 
[0.96] 
-0.53 
[0.93] 
3.81 
[0.54] 
2.46 
[0.72] 
4.68 
[0.59] 
    Parent bank characteristics 
Weakness    -0.08 
[0.28] 
-0.14 
[0.06]* 
-0.23 
[0.10]* 
   
Profitability    -0.12 
[0.45] 
-0.09 
[0.66] 
-0.74 
[0.04]** 
   
Liquidity    -0.53 
[0.00]*** 
-0.62 
[0.00]*** 
-0.33 
[0.10]* 
   
Interest margin    5.72 
[0.01]*** 
6.56 
[0.00]*** 
2.73 
[0.07]* 
   
Characteristics home country and other subsidiaries 
GDP growth       -1.51 
[0.09]* 
-2.35 
[0.05]** 
-3.67 
[0.01]*** 
Weakness (other subs.)      -0.07 
[0.33] 
-0.14 
[0.11] 
-0.18 
[0.37] 
Profitability        0.19 
[0.05]** 
0.21 
[0.01]*** 
0.08 
[0.74] 
Liquidity        -0.15 
[0.28] 
-0.27 
[0.06]* 
-0.21 
[0.34] 
Solvency       -0.09 
[0.84] 
-0.54 
[0.21] 
0.84 
[0.15] 
Crisis other countries      -10.77 
[0.33] 
-15.08 
[0.25] 
-34.44 
[0.25] 
Constant 29.82 
[0.00]*** 
28.42 
[0.00]*** 
11.56 
[0.01]*** 
28.70 
[0.00]*** 
25.33 
[0.00]*** 
30.71 
[0.00]*** 
42.00 
[0.00]*** 
43.20 
[0.00]*** 
32.95 
[0.00]*** 
Observations 967 763 967 905 703 905 674 523 674 
No. banks 
No. instruments 
194 183 194 
177 
194 182 194 
177 
146 138 146 
137 
R2within 0.13   0.16   0.17   
Hausman 0.00   0.01   0.00   
AB test AR1  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
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 AB test AR2 0.56 0.18 0.67 0.78 0.23 0.45 
Wald    0.00 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.06 
Hansen J  0.85 0.87  0.88 0.98  0.90 0.88 
Notes: p-values in brackets. ‘GMM diff.’ and ‘GMM system’ refer to estimations using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) difference panel-data estimator (robust) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) system panel-data estimator 
(robust), respectively. ‘Hausman’: p-value of the Hausman specification test. ‘AB test AR1(2)’: p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. ‘Wald’: p-value of the 
Wald F-test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are jointly 0. ‘Hansen J’: p-
value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the 
null of instrument validity. ‘Ownership’ is a dummy variable which takes on the values of 0 (1) for takeovers 
(greenfields). ‘Distance’ is the geographical distance between a subsidiary and its parent bank measured on the 
basis of the latitude and longitude co-ordinates of both banks using the great circle distance formula. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
It transpires that the positive association between subsidiary lending and host country growth is driven 
by both the greenfield effect and the distance effect. Greenfield subsidiaries are not just more tightly 
managed because they are on average further away. Again, these results only hold for the fixed effects 
and the difference GMM estimations. 
 
6. Robustness 
The empirical results in Section 5 show that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is partly 
determined by developments in other parts of the group. However, the results may to some extent also 
be caused by other mechanisms that do not reflect intra-bank relationships. For instance, 
macroeconomic developments in the home country may affect the lending of a multinational bank 
subsidiary in a host country because of more general economic linkages between both countries. Such 
linkages may also influence domestic bank lending. 
 As an example, if economic growth in Spain picks up, Spanish firms that operate in both Spain 
and Latin America may expand their domestic activities at the expense of their Latin American 
operations. To the extent that this shift in focus reduces their demand for credit in Latin America, 
lending by Spanish bank subsidiaries and domestic banks in Latin America will decrease. We would 
then observe a negative correlation between Spanish GDP growth and lending by all types of banks in 
Latin America. One cannot attribute this correlation to an active involvement of Spanish parent banks 
in the credit supply of their foreign subsidiaries. It would rather reflect an autonomous reaction of 
these subsidiaries and/or domestic banks to changes in credit demand that follow from 
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 macroeconomic linkages. To analyze to what extent our results are driven by such general linkages 
between countries, we perform two robustness tests. 
 
6.1 Domestic banks as a benchmark 
As a first robustness test we re-estimate the regressions of Table 1 for a benchmark group of the five 
largest domestically-owned banks in each host country (Table 4). These domestic banks are similar to 
the multinational bank subsidiaries; the main difference is that they have higher loan loss provisions 
to net interest revenue ratios, indicating a weaker loan portfolio (see Annex 2). 
 The first two columns of Table 4 show the re-estimation of the basic model, in which credit 
growth only depends on the bank’s characteristics and on local economic developments. Domestic 
bank lending depends on profitability, liquidity, solvency, and the local business cycle in much the 
same way as lending by multinational bank subsidiaries does. However, lending by domestic banks 
tends to be somewhat less procyclical (lower sensitivity to host country growth) than lending by 
multinational bank subsidiaries (in line with prediction 1). 
 Another interesting difference is that domestic bank lending decreases substantially during local 
banking crises. While the size of the coefficient differs somewhat across estimation methods, on 
average a domestic bank reduces its loan growth by 9.6 per cent during a financial crisis year. As 
lending by domestic banks in our sample increased on average by 10.8 per cent per year, this means 
that domestic banks virtually halt their credit expansion during crisis periods. This stands in contrast 
to the results in Table 1, which show that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is not sensitive to 
banking crises. Apparently, subsidiaries can rely on parental support during a financial crisis, a form 
of support that is not available to domestic banks. This finding confirms our second prediction and is 
in line with results reported by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) for a sample of transition countries. 
 An alternative though related explanation for this finding is that multinational bank subsidiaries 
are able to keep up lending not because they actually get parental support but because they could 
receive it if necessary. The mere potential for parental support means that depositors may view 
multinational bank subsidiaries as a safe haven during crisis periods, resulting in a deposit inflow that 
allows such subsidiaries to continue lending. We test for this by running regressions in which we 
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 explain deposit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries by the same bank-specific characteristics, 
macroeconomic variables, and crisis dummy (results available on request). The results show that 
weaker subsidiaries (higher loan loss provisions to net interest revenue) can increase their deposits 
much less than stronger subsidiaries (1 per cent level significance). We also find evidence, although 
only at the 10 per cent level, that during crisis periods subsidiaries see their deposits increase. 
However, these effects are not robust to the inclusion of parent bank variables (which are not 
significant either). While multinational bank subsidiaries experience some additional deposit inflows 
during crises, this effect is not large enough to explain the strong difference between domestic banks 
and multinational bank subsidiaries as regards their lending sensitivity to crisis periods. 
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 Table 4 Robustness test: are domestic banks influenced by similar variables as multinational 
bank subsidiaries? 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of domestic banks (in per cent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE GMM 
Diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
    Domestic bank characteristics 
Credit growth 
(lagged) 
0.04 
[0.10]* 
0.03 
[0.43] 
0.07 
[0.39] 
-0.00 
[0.98] 
-0.05 
[0.31] 
0.04 
[0.65] 
0.07 
[0.08]* 
0.11 
[0.08]* 
0.18 
[0.04]** 
Weakness 0.00 
[0.68] 
0.00 
[0.85] 
0.01 
[0.54] 
0.00 
[0.89] 
-0.00 
[0.90] 
-0.01 
[0.76] 
-0.03 
[0.58] 
-0.04 
[0.60] 
-0.00 
[0.90] 
Profitability 0.44 
[0.00]*** 
[0.31] 
[0.00]*** 
0.18 
[0.09]* 
0.52 
[0.00]*** 
0.34 
[0.01]*** 
0.30 
[0.07]* 
0.18 
[0.17] 
0.09 
[0.56] 
0.08 
[0.60] 
Liquidity -0.23 
[0.00]*** 
-0.49 
[0.00]*** 
-0.45 
[0.00]*** 
-0.31 
[0.00]*** 
-0.38 
[0.01]*** 
-0.29 
[0.02]** 
-0.41 
[0.00]*** 
-0.29 
[0.10]* 
-0.40 
[0.00]*** 
Solvency -0.64 
[0.01]*** 
-1.49 
[0.02]** 
-0.13 
[0.67] 
-0.87 
[0.01]*** 
-0.91 
[0.23] 
-0.47 
[0.24] 
-1.04 
[0.01]*** 
-0.64 
[0.06]* 
-1.29 
[0.00]*** 
Host country characteristics 
GDP growth 1.17 
[0.00]*** 
1.41 
[0.00]*** 
1.99 
[0.00]*** 
0.75 
[0.01]*** 
0.94 
[0.01]*** 
1.35 
[0.01]*** 
1.61 
[0.00]*** 
1.62 
[0.00]*** 
1.79 
[0.00]*** 
Unemployment -0.97 
[0.00]*** 
-0.16 
[0.75] 
0.41 
[0.44] 
-0.60 
[0.19] 
-0.31 
[0.65] 
0.10 
[0.86] 
-1.86 
[0.00]*** 
-1.49 
[0.00]*** 
-0.72 
[0.04]** 
Exchange rate 
[US$] 
-0.01 
[0.03]** 
-0.01 
[0.02]** 
-0.01 
[0.32] 
-0.01 
[0.07]* 
-0.01 
[0.16] 
-0.01 
[0.17] 
0.02 
[0.40] 
0.01 
[0.62] 
0.02 
[0.08]* 
Crisis dummy -6.93 
[0.00]*** 
-5.90 
[0.02]** 
-7.57 
[0.08]* 
-10.74 
[0.00]*** 
-8.72 
[0.01]*** 
-17.06 
[0.00]*** 
4.14 
[0.50] 
4.46 
[0.57] 
3.14 
[0.76] 
    Foster parent bank characteristics 
Weakness    0.00 
[0.97] 
-0.05 
[0.51] 
0.06 
[0.78] 
   
Profitability    -0.12 
[0.48] 
-0.04 
[0.84] 
0.01 
[0.98] 
   
Liquidity foster    -0.13 
[0.40] 
0.04 
[0.85] 
-0.01 
[0.98] 
   
Interest margin    3.09 
[0.13] 
8.09 
[0.08]* 
2.58 
[0.40] 
   
Characteristics foster home country and other subsidiaries foster parent bank 
GDP growth foster home       -1.76 
[0.01]*** 
-2.20 
[0.01]*** 
-2.26 
[0.02]** 
Weakness (other subs.)      0.03 
[0.66] 
-0.00 
[0.99] 
0.07 
[0.65] 
Profitability        0.31 
[0.13] 
0.35 
[0.12] 
0.31 
[0.33] 
Liquidity        -0.13 
[0.46] 
-0.30 
[0.11] 
-0.21 
[0.40] 
Solvency       -0.01 
[0.99] 
-0.49 
[0.42] 
0.59 
[0.46] 
Crisis other countries      -6.54 
[0.37] 
-10.57 
[0.25] 
-12.38 
[0.40] 
Constant 21.30 
[0.00]*** 
27.95 
[0.00]*** 
9.71 
[0.08]* 
19.84 
[0.00]*** 
5.16 
[0.64] 
7.44 
[0.47] 
35.33 
[0.00]*** 
36.14 
[0.00]*** 
25.13 
[0.01]*** 
Observations 1465 1241 1465 1033 822 1033 687 534 687 
No. banks 
No. instruments 
179 175 179 
137 
178 173 178 
137 
147 139 147 
137 
R2within 0.13   0.13   0.14   
Hausman 0.00   0.01   0.00   
AB test AR1 
AB test AR2 
 0.00 
0.77 
0.00 
0.25 
 0.00 
0.57 
0.00 
0.56 
 0.00 
0.67 
0.00 
0.82 
Wald    0.42 0.55 0.63 0.11 0.07 0.09 
Hansen J  0.88 0.80  0.78 0.67  0.80 0.80 
Notes: p-values in brackets. ‘GMM diff.’ and ‘GMM system’ refer to estimations using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) difference panel-data estimator (robust) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) system panel-data estimator 
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 (robust), respectively. ‘Hausman’: p-value of the Hausman specification test. ‘AB test AR1(2)’: p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. ‘Wald’: p-value of the 
Wald F-test that parameters associated with foster parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are jointly 0. ‘Hansen 
J’: p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under 
the null of instrument validity. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
We also check whether domestic bank lending is influenced by developments in the home countries of 
their foreign competitor banks. If we were to find such influences, this would imply that our earlier 
results for multinational bank subsidiaries do not only reflect intra-bank linkages but also broader 
international economic relationships. To analyze this issue we link each domestic bank to a ‘foster 
parent bank’. For each host country we create a set of foster parent banks that includes all the parent 
banks of the multinational bank subsidiaries that operate in that host country. When this number is 
less than five, we add banks from the same home countries. We then randomly assign one of these 
foster parent banks to each domestic bank. As the results of a single random assignment are not 
representative, we estimate each model a thousand times. 
 Table 4 reports the mean estimated coefficients and p values of these thousand runs in columns 3 
to 6. Since no real ownership linkages exist between the domestic banks and their foster parent banks, 
any results that would point to a sensitivity to the foster parent bank’s characteristics (columns 3 and 
4) or to the characteristics of other subsidiaries of the foster parent bank (columns 5 and 6) cannot be 
explained by an internal capital market and must therefore be attributed to more general 
macroeconomic linkages. 
The results show that domestic banks are not sensitive to the liquidity and net interest margin of their 
foster parent banks. We also find that whereas lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is sensitive 
to profitability changes in other subsidiaries of their parent bank, domestic banks are not sensitive to 
the profitability of the foster parent subsidiaries. These results imply that our earlier results for 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries indeed point to internal capital market effects. However, 
we also find strong evidence that lending by domestic banks is negatively related to the business cycle 
in the home countries of their foreign competitor banks. This means that our earlier findings on 
substitution effects are at least partly due to more general macroeconomic linkages between home 
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 countries and host countries (that also influence the lending of domestic banks, though via credit 
demand rather than credit supply). 
 
6.2 Linking multinational bank subsidiaries to foster parent banks 
As a second robustness test we randomly link each multinational bank subsidiary to a foster parent 
bank from the same home country. For each host country the set of foster parent banks again consists 
of approximately five large banks. We include additional home country banks if there are not enough 
real parent banks from the same home country. For instance, since we only have one Danish parent 
bank in our dataset, we add four large Danish banks to our set of Danish foster parent banks. Annex 2 
shows that the average foster parent bank is similar to the average real parent bank, although foster 
parent banks are on average smaller. As a single random allocation of foster parent banks to 
subsidiaries is not representative, we estimate each model a thousand times. Table 5 reports the mean 
estimated coefficients and p values of these thousand runs. We expect our earlier results to become 
insignificant as lending by a multinational bank subsidiary should not depend on what is happening to 
other banks in the home country of its real parent bank. 
 Comparing Table 5 with our earlier results in Table 1 shows that lending by multinational bank 
subsidiaries is negatively related to the business cycle in the home country of the foster parent bank. 
This is logical as, by construction, the foster parent bank is located in the same country as the real 
parent bank, and we know – see Table 1 – that there exists a strong negative link between the home 
country business cycle of the parent bank and subsidiary lending. More importantly, we find that 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is sensitive to the liquidity and interest margin of the real 
parent bank (Table 1) but not of the foster parent bank in the same home country. Moreover, while 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries depends on profitability changes in other subsidiaries of 
the real parent bank, this effect disappears if we link subsidiaries to foster parent banks. These results 
further strengthen our claim that our earlier empirical findings reflect intra-bank linkages in the form 
of an internal capital market. 
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 Table 5 Robustness test: are multinational banks influenced by developments in non-related 
‘foster’ parent banks 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
FE GMM 
diff. 
GMM 
system 
Subsidiary characteristics 
Credit growth 
(lagged) 
0.02 
[0.67] 
0.05 
[0.45] 
0.16 
[0.10]* 
0.05 
[0.34] 
0.05 
[0.53] 
0.24 
[0.06]* 
Weakness -0.00 
[0.96] 
0.00 
[0.95] 
0.01 
[0.57] 
-0.07 
[0.30] 
-0.08 
[0.28] 
-0.08 
[0.33] 
Profitability 0.30 
[0.00]*** 
0.25 
[0.00]*** 
0.27 
[0.01]*** 
0.10 
[0.54] 
0.03 
[0.88] 
-0.08 
[0.73] 
Liquidity -0.46 
[0.00]*** 
-0.39 
[0.04]** 
-0.20 
[0.09]* 
-0.37 
[0.02]** 
-0.35 
[0.08]* 
-0.35 
[0.03]** 
Solvency -1.21 
[0.01]*** 
-0.72 
[0.34] 
-0.99 
[0.01]*** 
-1.43 
[0.03]** 
-0.68 
[0.43] 
-1.23 
[0.08]* 
Host country characteristics 
GDP growth 0.84 
[0.05]** 
0.76 
[0.17] 
1.14 
[0.04]** 
1.02 
[0.05]** 
1.19 
[0.04]** 
1.75 
[0.01]*** 
Unemployment -0.88 
[0.21] 
-0.65 
[0.45] 
0.13 
[0.80] 
-1.16 
[0.15] 
-1.23 
[0.16] 
-0.39 
[0.50] 
Exchange rate [US$] 0.00 
[0.94] 
0.01 
[0.67] 
0.00 
[0.88] 
-0.00 
[0.94] 
0.01 
[0.77] 
0.01 
[0.65] 
Crisis dummy -7.79 
[0.19] 
-8.33 
[0.06]* 
-9.08 
[0.18] 
-10.47 
[0.11] 
-6.97 
[0.11] 
-9.64 
[0.29] 
    Foster parent bank characteristics 
Weakness -0.08 
[0.23] 
-0.08 
[0.13] 
-0.08 
[0.58] 
   
Profitability -0.12 
[0.51] 
-0.18 
[0.34] 
-0.36 
[0.31] 
   
Liquidity -0.36 
[0.13] 
-0.36 
[0.19] 
-0.41 
[0.14] 
   
Interest margin 4.21 
[0.13] 
3.34 
[0.35] 
-0.04 
[0.99] 
   
Characteristics foster home country and other subsidiaries foster parent bank 
GDP growth    -1.88 
[0.03]** 
-2.60 
[0.00]*** 
-3.22 
[0.01]*** 
Weakness (other subs. foster bank)   -0.09 
[0.33] 
-0.12 
[0.16] 
-0.09 
[0.60] 
Profitability   0.35 
[0.12] 
0.36 
[0.11] 
0.30 
[0.45] 
Liquidity   -0.01 
[0.95] 
0.00 
[0.98] 
-0.07 
[0.77] 
Solvency   -0.78 
[0.21] 
-0.91 
[0.15] 
0.03 
[0.97] 
Crisis other countries   -4.81 
[0.75] 
-6.19 
[0.70] 
-4.43 
[0.90] 
Constant 30.33 
[0.00]*** 
26.73 
[0.04]** 
27.66 
[0.0]*** 
43.58 
[0.00]*** 
40.84 
[0.00]*** 
32.82 
[0.02]** 
Observations      635      481      635      456      340      456 
No. banks 
No. instruments 
     149      141 
     136 
     149 
     136 
     111      106 
     121 
     111 
     121 
R2within 0.12   0.15   
Hausman 0.00   0.00   
AB test AR1 
AB test AR2 
 0.00 
0.71 
0.00 
0.60 
 0.00 
0.21 
0.01 
0.58 
Wald 0.56 0.41 0.67 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Hansen J  0.78 0.68  0.56 0.34 
Notes: p-values in brackets. ‘GMM diff.’ and ‘GMM system’ refer to estimations using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) difference panel-data estimator (robust) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) system panel-data estimator 
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 (robust), respectively. ‘Hausman’: p-value of the Hausman specification test. ‘AB test AR1(2)’: p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. ‘Wald’: p-value of the 
Wald F-test that parameters associated with foster parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are jointly 0. ‘Hansen 
J’: p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under 
the null of instrument validity. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
7.  Summary and conclusions 
We examine whether multinational banks operate an internal capital market and, if so, whether the 
presence of financially integrated banks exposes countries to foreign economic developments. We 
analyze how multinational bank lending is influenced by the macroeconomic situation in the host 
country and in the home country, and by the financial characteristics of the subsidiary itself, those of 
the parent bank, and those of other subsidiaries. This is the first paper to analyze these micro and 
macro determinants of multinational bank lending within an integrated empirical framework. 
 Our findings indicate that multinational banks manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. In 
particular, we find strong proof of support effects. Subsidiaries of strong parent banks – that have high 
net interest margins or low loan loss provisioning to net interest revenue – grow faster. Subsidiaries of 
parent banks that keep less liquid assets on their balance sheets are able to grow faster as well. If other 
subsidiaries in the same banking group are relatively profitable this also positively influences 
subsidiary lending. Finally, we find that during systemic banking crises, multinational bank 
subsidiaries keep lending, whereas domestic banks are forced to sharply restrict their credit supply. 
Robustness tests add further credibility to the claim that our findings do not reflect macroeconomic 
linkages but intrabank capital management. As Houston et al. (1997) did for national bank holdings, 
we provide evidence for the operation of internal capital markets at the international level. 
 We find weaker empirical support for substitution effects. We show that, in line with substitution 
effects, multinational bank subsidiaries expand lending faster when economic growth in their home 
country decreases. Likewise, we find that high host country growth stimulates credit growth, although 
this effect is limited to greenfield and remote subsidiaries. However, our robustness tests show that 
domestic bank lending is also procyclical (though somewhat less so) and also negatively related to 
economic growth in the home countries of foreign competitor banks. So while our findings are in line 
with substitution effects, they may also partly reflect macroeconomic linkages between countries. 
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 Our findings imply that openness to multinational bank subsidiaries can benefit host countries. Since 
the pace of multinational bank lending is partly determined abroad, the aggregate credit supply in the 
host country becomes more stable and less strongly correlated with the local business cycle. We find 
that multinational banks provide a stabilizing factor during local financial turmoil in particular. 
Diversity in bank ownership therefore contributes to credit stability, allowing firms with binding 
credit constraints to optimize investments and households to better smooth consumption over time. 
 An important caveat is that the above interpretation of our results presumes that parent banks 
operate an internal capital market because they are better able to attract liquidity and raise capital than 
individual subsidiaries. If parent banks themselves experience problems with raising funds, they may 
no longer be able to support subsidiaries. Lending by foreign subsidiaries may even be scaled back in 
order to free up capital for the parent bank, leading to contagion from home to host countries. 
 Indeed, the global financial crisis is currently testing the resilience of the support effects 
documented in this paper. Multinational banks have so far continued to support their foreign 
subsidiaries. For instance, in Kazakhstan, cross-border foreign bank credit to domestic banks has 
dried up and the latter consequently had to rein in their own lending. Multinational bank subsidiaries 
were much less affected. ATF Bank, a mid-sized Kazakh bank owned by the Italian UniCredit group, 
for instance obtained credit lines and capital injections from its parent bank. In Latvia, multinational 
bank subsidiaries continued to receive funding from their parent banks, while Parex Bank, the second-
largest bank and the only domestic bank left in the country, suffered a run on its deposits, forcing the 
government to step in. Both examples illustrate that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries tends 
to be more stable than cross-border foreign bank lending (see also Peek and Rosengren, 2000a). 
 For countries that plan to open up their banking system, it may thus make sense to not only 
permit cross-border foreign bank lending, but to also allow committed multinational banks to 
establish or buy local subsidiaries. When doing so, countries should ideally encourage entry from a 
variety of home countries. Diversified multinational bank ownership is preferred to highly 
concentrated foreign ownership as the latter implies an overreliance on intrabank support from one or 
a very small number of foreign parent banks. 
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 Annex 1  Overview of the multinational banks in the dataset 
Table A1.1 
List of multinational banks and their subsidiaries that are in the sample 
 
 Name bank holding Home country Subs Host countries 
1 ABN Amro Holding Netherlands 5 AU, BR, FR, NL, US 
2 Allied Irish Bank Ireland 2 PL, UK 
3 Banca Intesa Italy 11 HR, FR, HU, IE, IT, PE, SK 
4 Banco Bilbao V. Argentaria Spain 9 AR, CL, CO, MX, PE, PT, ES, US, VE 
5 Banco Comercial Português Portugal 2 MZ, PL 
6 Banco Popular Español Spain 8 FR, ES 
7 Banco Santander Spain 11 BR, CL, DE, MX, ES, US, VE 
8 Bank of America USA 2 HK, US 
9 Bank of Ireland Ireland 1 UK 
10 Bank of Montreal Canada 2 IE, US 
11 Barclays Bank UK 1 ES 
12 Bayerische HVB Germany 9 CZ, HU, PL, RU, AT 
13 BNP Paribas France 4 FR, US 
14 Caja de Barcelona Spain 2 FR, ES 
15 Citicorp USA 8 BR, CA, MY, MX, PL, US 
16 Commerzbank Germany 4 DE, NL, PL 
17 Danske Bank Denmark 1 NO 
18 Deutsche Bank Germany 6 DE, IT, ES, US 
19 Dexia Belgium 7 BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, ES 
20 Dresdner Bank Germany 1 DE 
21 DZ Bank Germany 4 DE, IE 
22 Erste Bank Austria 8 CZ, HU, AT, SK 
23 FöreningsSparbanken Sweden 5 EE, LV, LT, SE 
24 Fortis Bank Belgium 3 BE, FR, NL 
25 Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 3 FR, IT 
26 HBOS UK 4 IE, UK 
27 HSBC Holdings UK 12 BR, CA, FR, DE, HK, IN, MY, SA, UK, US 
28 ING Bank Netherlands 5 BE, CA, FR, NL, PL 
29 KBC Bank Belgium 7 BE, CZ, DE, HU, IE, PL 
30 MBNA Corp USA 3 CA, UK, US 
31 Mitsubishi Tokyo Group Japan 4 JP, US 
32 National Australia Bank Australia 2 NZ, UK 
33 National Bank of Greece Greece 4 BG, CA, CY, US 
34 Nordea Bank Sweden 6 DK, FI, NO, SE 
35 Rabobank Group Netherlands 1 IE 
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 36 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Austria 8 BG, HR, CZ, PL, RU, SI, UA, SK 
37 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 2 UK, US 
38 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 5 UK, US 
39 Scotiabank Canada 4 SV, MX, UK, US 
40 SEB Sweden 5 EE, DE, LV, LT, SE 
41 Standard Chartered UK 4 KE, MY, TH, UK 
42 Société Générale France 7 AU, CA, CZ, FR, DE 
43 UBS Switzerland 1 UK 
44 UniCredit Group Italy 5 BG, IE, IT, PL 
45 WGZ Bank Germany 2 DE, IE 
Country abbreviations: AR=Argentina, AT=Austria, AU=Australia, BE=Belgium, BG=Bulgaria, BR=Brazil, 
CA=Canada, CL=Chile, CO=Colombia, CY=Cyprus, CZ=Czech Republic, DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, 
EE=Estonia, ES=Spain, FI=Finland, FR=France, HK=Hong Kong, HR=Croatia, HU=Hungary, IE=Ireland, 
IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, KE=Kenya, LV=Latvia, LT=Lithuania, MX=Mexico, MY=Malaysia, 
MZ=Mozambique, NL=The Netherlands, NO=Norway, NZ=New Zealand, PE=Peru, PL=Poland, PT=Portugal, 
RU=Russia, SA=Saudi Arabia, SE=Sweden, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovak Republic, SV=El Salvador, 
TH=Thailand, UA=Ukraine, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States of America, VE=Venezuela. 
 
 36
 Annex 2 Statistical annex 
Table A2.1 
Definitions, data sources, and summary statistics of the main variables 
 
Variable Definition Data source Bank type Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Obs. 
Parent 11.1 9.2 14.1 387 
Subsidiary 12.3 10.2 21.4 1,240 
Domestic 10.8 9.6 20.7 1,798 
Loan growth Percentage 
growth of gross 
credit (net loans 
plus loan loss 
reserves) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 11.3 9.4 16.6 409 
Parent 274,012 184,828 25,570 387 
Subsidiary 28,520 6,260 7,486 1,240 
Domestic 26,144 4,088 9,468 1,798 
Bank size Total assets 
(million US$) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 127,646 39,828 22,661 409 
Parent 5.3 4.8 2.6 387 
Subsidiary 7.8 6.8 5.4 1,240 
Domestic 8.6 7.4 5.8 1,798 
Bank solvency Total equity/total 
assets (%) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 5.4 5.4 1.9 409 
Parent 17.0 15.6 9.7 387 
Subsidiary 17.1 14.4 15.0 1,240 
Domestic 18.9 16.9 14.2 1,798 
Bank liquidity Liquid assets/total 
assets (%) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 16.6 14.1 13.0 409 
Parent 2.4 2.3 1.2 387 
Subsidiary 3.1 2.7 2.4 1,240 
Domestic 4.0 3.1 4.2 1,798 
Bank interest 
margin 
Interest income 
earned on assets 
less interest 
expense paid on 
liabilities /total 
assets (%) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 2.4 2.4 1.1 409 
Parent 13.8 14.7 7.6 387 
Subsidiary 12.7 12.5 11.4 1,240 
Domestic 10.5 10.2 11.0 1,798 
Bank 
profitability 
Return on equity 
(%) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 11.2 12.1 9.7 409 
Parent 18.4 15.2 16.9 387 
Subsidiary 17.6 12.7 43.3 1,240 
Domestic 27.2 15.6 163.5 1,798 
Bank weakness Loan loss 
provisions/net 
interest revenue 
(%) 
BankScope 
Foster parent 24.2 15.1 18.3 409 
Geographical 
distance 
Distance between 
parent bank and 
subsidiary in 
kilometers 
calculated using 
the great circle 
distance formula 
www.tageo.com 
for latitude and 
longitude 
coordinates 
 2,970 637 4,283 1,234 
Home countries 2.5 2.5 1.6 387 GDP growth  Yearly change in 
GDP (%) 
IMF, EBRD, 
Datastream 
Host countries 2.9 2.8 2.3 1,212 
Unemployment  Unemployment IMF, EBRD, Home countries 7.8 7.4 3.1 387 
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rate (%) Datastream 
Host countries 8.4 7.7 4.1 1,212 
Home countries 0.03 0.00 0.17 387 Crisis dummy Yearly dummy 
variable which is 
‘1’ in case of 
banking crisis and 
‘0’ otherwise 
Caprio and 
Klingebiel 
(2002); Carstens 
et al. (2004) 
Host countries 0.06 0.00 0.24 1,240 
Macroeconomic data taken from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), Transition Reports of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), IMF World Economic Outlook, and Datastream. 
 
Table A2.2 
Stationarity tests 
 Solvency Liquidity Interest 
margin 
Profitability Weakness 
Hadri (2000)* I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Pesaran (2003) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Taylor and Sarno (1998) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
* Based on a balanced sub-panel as required by the Hadri (2000) panel unit root test. 
 38
